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Abstract
In a recent paper, Nagata [1] claims to derive inconsistencies from
quantum mechanics. In this paper, we show that the inconsistencies do
not come from quantum mechanics, but from extra assumptions about
the reality of observables.
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Quantum mechanics is one of the best tested theories in modern physics,
and yet there is no consensus as to what it means. The reason lies in the fact
that, as Feynman eloquently put, “nobody understands quantum mechanics”
[2]. This lack of understanding comes from the difficulties to interpret even
the simplest of the examples, like the two-slit experiment, in ways that are
consistent with the observations and with an underlying ontology that most
consider satisfactory (for distinct approaches, see [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]). For example,
quantum mechanical observables do not allow for standard joint probability
measures to be defined [9, 10, 11, 12], and if we assume such probabilities, we
derive contradictions [13]. Furthermore, the structure of observables does not
satisfy a classical logic, but instead a quantum one [14]. Thus, an area of intense
interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics is the search for theories that
complete quantum mechanics, such as hidden-variable theories, and give sense
to it [6].
In a recent paper, Koji Nagata looked into the possibility that quantum
mechanics leads to contradictions [1]. Though, as mentioned in many of the
references above, contradictions can be derived depending on the assumptions
used, Nagata goes further and claim that “there is a contradiction within the
Hilbert space formalism of the quantum theory.” He then concludes that no
axiomatization exists for quantum mechanics. In this paper, we clarify some
assumptions made by Nagata and show that the derived contradictions are not
part of the theoretical structure of the theory, but instead are part of metaphys-
ical assumptions about the systems. Therefore, the contradictions obtained by
Nagata are not an impediment to the axiomatization of the theory, but instead
to a specific worldview.
Let us start with Nagata’s derivation of a contradiction. In [1], a pure
state spin- 1
2
system on the x-y plane is considered. He then goes on to show
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that if we compute the quantum mechanical expectation of such state measured
in an arbitrary direction ~n, the expected value EQM ≤ 1, which implies that
|EQM |max = 1. This result is consistent with the fact that, for his choice of
units ~/2 = 1, if the system is prepared in the same direction as ~n, we always
get the same answer as 1. Finally, Nagata shows that if we use a collapsed
state and then compute the expectation, E′QM ≤ 2, implying
∣
∣E′QM
∣
∣
max
= 2
(we changed the notation to E′ to avoid confusion with the previous value).
Thus, Nagata claims, because |EQM |max cannot have two different values, we
arrive at a contradiction. Before we proceed, we would like to point out that
Nagata’s inequalities do not by themselves imply a contradiction. For example,
the statements b ≤ 1 and b ≤ 2 are not contradictory, as b = 0 is an example
that satisfies them. To prove a contradiction, Nagata would have to construct
a system which he could prove not only is less than 2 but is also greater than 1.
Though he did not show such proof, it in fact exists. But to make clear where
the contradiction comes from, we present it below in a simplified version.
At the core of Nagata’s derivation lies an important feature of quantum
mechanics, namely that if you do not measure something you cannot assume that
it has a value. In other words, assuming values to unmeasured observables leads
to contradictions (see [15, 13] and references therein). Let us analyze the case
of a spin- 1
2
system. First, let us see what quantum mechanics can tell us about
this system. If we want to observe its spin in a given direction ~m, the associated
observable is Oˆ~m ≡ ~m · ~σ, where ~σ is a vector in R
3 with the Pauli matrices as
components, i.e. ~σ = (σˆx, σˆy, σˆz). From the properties of the Pauli matrices,
it is easy to show that Oˆ~m has eigenvalues ±1, regardless of the measurement
direction. Since ~m is arbitrary, let us we pick three distinct directions, ~e1,~e2,
and ~e3, such that ~e1 + ~e2 + ~e3 = 0. The corresponding observables will be
Oˆ1 ≡ ~e1 · ~σ, Oˆ2 ≡ ~e2 · ~σ, and Oˆ3 ≡ ~e3 · ~σ. Quantum mechanics not only tells
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us that measuring Oˆ1, Oˆ2, or Oˆ3 yields ±1 values, but it also tells us that we
cannot measure them simultaneously, as they do not commute.
A natural question to ask is the following. Is it possible to assign a value to
spin, even though a measurement has not been performed? To answer this, let
us assume that we indeed can assign such value (we follow [16, pp. 15-16]). Let
P be a vector random variable corresponding to the actual value of the system’s
spin before any measurement. It follows that if we measure it in a direction ~m,
the outcome of the experiment must be ~m · P. Now, quantum mechanics tells
us that, regardless of the direction, ~m ·P will take values +1 or −1. But, using
the vectors we picked before, we have
~e1 ·P+ ~e2 ·P+ ~e3 ·P = (~e1 + ~e2 + ~e3) ·P (1)
= 0.
This, of course, leads to a contradiction, as the sum of three ±1 random variables
cannot equal zero.
An analysis of the above example shows the origin of the contradiction. Since
quantum mechanics forbids the simultaneous measurements of Oˆk, as they do
not commute, it does not allow us to simultaneously assign values to them. The
contradiction does not come from quantum mechanics, but from the assumption
that we can assign values to measurements that were not performed. But not
even assigning values leads to contradiction, if we are careful. For example, we
could assign values to ~e1 ·P and to ~e2 ·P, as long as we assumed that the P in
~e1 ·P is different from the one in ~e2 ·P, a feature called contextuality [17].
The above example contains the essence of Nagata’s argument. By com-
puting the value of a quantity using the quantum mechanical formalism yields
different quantities than by computing it from the distribution over the ran-
dom variables associated with the (non-commuting) observables in quantum
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mechanics (his use of values from von Neuman’s projections). The reason for
this discrepancy in computations is that, in the latter case, there is an under-
lying assumption that an unmeasured quantity exists independent of the other
quantities. This, of course, is not true, as quantum mechanical variables are
contextually dependent from each other, a characteristic stressed by Bohr. We
emphasize that this characteristic of quantum mechanics is not at all disturb-
ing, as it is common to many classical systems [18]. The troubling characteristic
comes from a combination of contextuality and non-locality, made famous by
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper [19] and by Bell’s inequalities [20].
Quantum mechanics is indeed a strange theory. But its strangeness comes
not from an inconsistency of its mathematical structure, but from the meta-
physical views it imposes on us. If we insist on having worldviews where the
values of variables exist independent of the observation, then we will get into
contradictions. But, as many authors show, such contradictions can be avoided
by carefully interpreting the meaning of the mathematical formalism.
The author would like to thank Dr. Gary Oas for his comments on the final
version of the manuscript.
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